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Abstract 
The third-person effect is the tendency for people to perceive the media as more influential on 
others than on themselves.  The present study introduced a new methodological paradigm for 
measuring the TPE and examined whether the effect stems from an overestimation of the 
persuasibility of others, an underestimation of the persuasibility of the self, both, or neither.  
In three studies, we compared ratings of (a) current self attitudes (both baseline and post-
persuasion), (b) current others’ attitudes (both baseline and post-persuasion), (c), retrospective 
self attitudes, and (d) retrospective others’ attitudes.  We also measured traditional third-
person perception ratings of perceived influence.  Rather than overestimating others’ attitude 
change, we found evidence that people underestimated the extent to which their own attitudes 
had, or would have changed.  
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Right about others, wrong about ourselves?  Actual and perceived self-other differences in 
resistance to persuasion 
 The third-person effect or TPE (Davison, 1983) is the tendency for people to believe 
that socially undesirable media messages influence others more than themselves.  Much 
research documents the TPE in a variety of domains including politics and news (e.g., Duck, 
Hogg & Terry, 1995; Perloff, 1989; Salwen & Dupagne, 1999), advertising (Duck, Hogg & 
Terry, 1998, 1999; Gibbon & Durkin, 1995), defamatory messages (Cohen, Mutz, Price & 
Gunther, 1988; Gunther, 1991), pornography (Gunther, 1995), offensive music (Eveland, 
Nathanson, Detenber & McLeod, 1999; McLeod, Eveland & Nathanson, 1997) and ‘ideal’ 
female images (David & Johnson, 1998).  Research has also demonstrated a ‘reversed’ TPE 
whereby people perceive socially desirable messages as more influential on the self than 
others, (e.g., Duck, Terry & Hogg, 1995; Hoorens & Ruiter, 1996; Innes & Zeitz, 1988). 
As a robust self-serving bias, the TPE is relevant to ongoing endeavours to clarify the 
limits of accuracy in social cognition (see also Colvin & Block, 1994; Sutton & McClure, 
2001; Taylor & Brown, 1988).   It also appears to have important social consequences.  For 
example, the TPE has been found to predict endorsement of censorship and punitive 
responses to communicators (e.g., Gunther, 1995; McLeod et al., 1997).  In addition, the TPE 
has important social psychological antecedents, including a motive to maintain positive self 
esteem and a feeling of control over negative influences (e.g., Duck & Mullin, 1995; Duck et 
al., 1995; Perloff, 1983), judgements of the severity of media content (Shah et al., 1999), ego 
involvement (Perloff, 1989), and the social distance between self and others (Duck et al., 
1995; Duck et al.,  1998; Gibbon & Durkin, 1995). 
The TPE is traditionally measured by exposing participants to persuasive media 
content and asking them to rate its persuasive effects on the self and others.  The TPE is 
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therefore typically measured as the perceived difference between self and others’ 
persuasibility to media messages.  However, one important limitation of this methodology is 
that measures of own and others’ persuasibility are obtained without reference to an objective 
measure of actual influence (Gunther, 1991; Gunther & Thorson, 1992).  It is therefore 
impossible to determine the degree to which perceptions of one’s own persuasibility, and 
perceptions of others’, are in error.  For this reason, it is impossible to distinguish perceived 
self-other differences in persuasibility from actual self-other differences in persuasibility.  
The purpose of the present paper is therefore to outline and test a new method of assessing the 
TPE that distinguishes between perceived and actual persuasibility.  In so doing, we aim to 
attend to important, unanswered questions regarding the locus of error in third-person 
perceptions. 
To elaborate, in our proposed design perceived and actual attitude change are directly 
comparable because they are assessed using the same items and calculated in the same way.  
At time one, baseline attitudes and perceptions of others’ attitudes are obtained.  At time two, 
with the same items, participants read a message and then (a) rate their own current attitudes, 
(b) recall their pre-message attitudes, (c) rate others’ current attitudes, (d) retrospectively rate 
others’ pre-message attitudes.  Actual attitude change is the difference between participants’ 
attitudes at time one and their current attitudes at time two.  The change they attribute to 
themselves is reflected in the difference between their current and recalled attitudes at time 
two (i.e., between (a) and (b)).  The change participants attribute to others is reflected in the 
difference between their perceptions of others’ current and pre-message attitudes at time two 
(i.e., between (c) and (d)).   
By sampling an entire undergraduate class, our sample group is also the comparison 
group, in that undergraduate students were asked to rate their own opinions and those of other 
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undergraduate students.  This enabled us to identify whether participants’ perceptions of 
others were accurate with confidence.  This strategy has been successfully applied to other 
self-serving biases (e.g., Krueger & Dunning, 1999), and contrasts with other studies that 
have asked participants to compare themselves to broader, more remote groups such as ‘other 
university students’ for which no properly sampled empirical norm is available (e.g., Cohen et 
al., 1988, Gunther, 1991; Gunther & Thorson, 1992). 
Employing this novel methodology allows us to answer the important question of 
where the error lies in third-person judgements:  When people wrongly perceive others to be 
more influenced than themselves, do they underestimate how much they themselves were 
influenced, do they overestimate how much others were influenced, both, or is neither of 
these a cause of third-person perceptions?  This question is relevant to censorship debates, as 
noted by McLeod et al. (1997, p. 165):   
If it is the case… that third-person perceptions are based on an overestimation of 
effects of others, the desire for censorship caused by third-person perceptions is 
built on a flawed foundation. 
Conversely, if people are accurate about the effects on others but underestimate effects on 
themselves, the desire for censorship caused by third-person perceptions are not built on a 
flawed foundation, whatever the other merits and pitfalls of censorship might be.  
More generally, answering the question will guide social psychologists in 
characterizing and responding to the TPE.  Theoretically, the TPE may be an invulnerability 
bias, akin to people’s tendency to wrongly imagine that they are not personally at risk from 
environmental or health hazards (e.g., Greening & Chandler, 1997; Klar, Medding & Sarel, 
1996; Nurius, 2000, but see also Klein & Weinstein, 1997).  If so, a deleterious consequence 
of the bias might be that individuals complacently expose themselves to noxious media 
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content, without being introspectively aware of changes in attitudes that the content produces.  
The appropriate way to correct the bias may be to correct people’s inaccurate perceptions of 
themselves.   
 Some research in other domains suggests that people are often surprisingly inaccurate 
about their own mental processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Ross, 1977), particularly when 
they retrospectively report them (Ericsson & Simon, 1993).  In particular, after undergoing 
attitude change people often underestimate the degree of change (e.g., Bem & McConnell, 
1970; Markus, 1986; Wixon & Laird, 1976).  They are therefore often unaware that their 
attitudes have changed.  This suggests that people may often be wrong when evaluating the 
impact of a persuasive attempt on themselves.  
However, other research suggests that people are often inaccurate about judgements 
and expectations regarding others.  People may underestimate others’ emotional responses to 
stimuli but be relatively accurate about their own responses (e.g., Sabini, Cosmas, Siepmann 
& Stein, 1999).  Also, the TPE may reflect a kind of ‘naïve cynicism’ (Krueger & Gilovich, 
1999) or ‘observer harshness’ regarding others (Colvin & Block, 1994), whereby people 
wrongly perceive others to be affected by quite innocuous messages.  A deleterious 
consequence of the bias might be that people become unduly censorial (McLeod et al., 1997) 
or anxious about social decline (cf. Silka & Albright, 1984). The bias would then be corrected 
by addressing overly pessimistic perceptions of others. 
 Despite an abundance of research on the TPE, this issue has been relatively 
overlooked.  Only a small number of studies have investigated the accuracy issue, and none 
have used a methodology akin to the method we have proposed in this paper (see Cohen et al., 
1988; Gunther, 1991; Gunther & Thorson, 1992).  To illustrate the method used in previous 
studies, Gunther (1991) presented an experimental group with a negative newspaper article 
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about an American police chief.  He asked participants to rate their attitude to the police chief 
on a 19-point scale ranging from –9 (negative) to +9 (positive).  Actual attitude change was 
defined as the difference between the scores of the experimental group and a control group 
who did not read the message.   
For perceived change, Gunther asked participants to rate how much the article 
changed or would change their own and others’ attitudes, using a different item with another 
19-point scale with a ‘no change’ midpoint.  Anchor points were not reported.  To assess the 
accuracy of perceived attitude change for the self and others, Gunther compared the rated 
degree of attitude change to the index of actual attitude change.  Other studies examining the 
accuracy issue (Cohen et al., 1988; Gunther & Thorson, 1992) used a very similar method to 
Gunther (1991), comparing an index of perceived attitude change with a different index of 
actual attitude change.  Cohen et al. (1988) also did not report anchor points.  However, 
Gunther and Thorson (1992) indicated that pre-test attitude measures were seven-point scales 
anchored by descriptive terms including “good/bad, dislike/like, and positive/negative” (p. 
583) whereas the third-person effect measures were seven-point scales asking how much 
commercials affected their opinion of a product brand.  The scales were anchored by “more 
negative and more positive, with the midpoint as a no change score” (p. 584).   
The main issue regarding the use of this type of method is that scores on the perceived 
change item are not necessarily the same thing as difference scores derived from the attitude 
item.  For example, it is not clear that when a participant indicated “+2” on the perceived 
change item, their score would have changed by two points on the attitude item.  The 
psychological meaning of the arithmetic discrepancy between these indices of perceived and 
actual attitude change is therefore unclear.  It is interesting to note that this method has 
produced different findings across studies: Gunther (1991; Gunther & Thorson, 1992) 
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reported that perceived self ratings were closer to actual attitude change, whereas Cohen et al. 
(1988) reported that perceived other ratings were closer to actual attitude change.   
In an attempt to resolve this issue, we conducted three studies employing our new 
methodology which makes perceived and actual attitude change directly comparable.  In 
doing so, we examined the extent to which people’s perceptions of their own and others’ 
attitude change reflect actual attitude change, thus assessing how accurate people are in their 
judgements of self and others’ attitude change.   
Study 1 
In the first study, we asked undergraduate participants to rate their agreement or 
disagreement with a list of statements about the issue of gun control (baseline self).  They 
were then asked to rate how much they thought their classmates would agree or disagree with 
the statements (baseline other).  One week later, participants read a persuasive message about 
gun control and were presented with the same list of statements from the week before.  They 
were asked to rate (a) their current attitudes (current self), (b) what they perceived their 
classmates’ attitudes to be (current other), (c) their attitudes before reading the material 
(retrospective self) and (d) what they perceived their classmates’ attitudes were before they 
read the material (retrospective other).   
We hypothesised that people would perceive others to be more persuaded than 
themselves, by indicating lower perceived attitude change for the self (current self – 
retrospective self) than for others (current other – retrospective other).  By examining the 
difference between perceived and actual (current self – baseline self) attitude change scores, 
we sought to investigate if participants underestimate how much their own attitudes changed 
or overestimate the attitude change of others (see Cohen et al., 1988, Gunther, 1991; Gunther 
& Thorson, 1992).  
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Method 
Participants and Design 
 A total of 80 male and female undergraduate psychology students from a New Zealand 
University participated in the first phase of the experiment.  Out of this original sample, 65 
students also participated in phase two.  Participants’ median age was 23.0.  Each participant 
was rewarded with a small sweet for their participation.  The experiment consisted of a 2 
(person:  self/other) x 3 (time of attitude rating:  baseline/retrospective/current) repeated-
measures design. 
Materials and Procedure 
 The experiment consisted of two phases.  Firstly, participants were informed that the 
experiment was about opinions towards the issue of gun control.  Participants were also 
informed that the study would continue in the following week, and because their responses 
were anonymous, they were asked to write a code on their response sheet so that their 
responses in the first phase could be linked to their responses in the second phase. 
 Participants were then presented with six statements about the issue of gun control.  
These statements related to people’s rights to own guns and to protect themselves, the danger 
of guns to society, government restriction of guns, and the use of guns for sport and 
recreation.  The full list of items is presented in the Appendix.  Note that three items were 
reverse-coded.  For each statement, participants were asked to rate their agreement or 
disagreement on a seven-point scale from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 4 ‘neutral’ to 7 ‘strongly 
agree’.  The six-item scale had acceptable reliability (Cronbach’s α = .80).  Question order 
was randomised. 
 After completing the ratings of their own agreement or disagreement with the gun 
control statements, participants were asked to complete the same scale, but were asked instead 
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to rate how much they thought other people in their class would agree or disagree with each 
statement. 1  The scale for ratings of classmates’ attitudes was moderately reliable 
(Cronbach’s α = .63), although less so than for ratings of own attitudes.  At the end of phase 
one, participants were asked to remember their code and were thanked for their time. 
 Phase two of the experiment took place one week later.  The delay was intended to 
make it more difficult for participants to remember their original responses.  A cover sheet 
informed participants that they would be asked to read some material about the issue of gun 
control and respond to some questions.  They were then asked to turn the page and read the 
material carefully.  The material presented to participants was a pro-gun extract from an 
Internet website entitled “The Right to Keep and Bear Arms” (http://www.rkba.com).  The 
message argued against gun control, promoting the rights of people to own guns, alleging that 
restricting gun ownership is unfair, and outlining several putative reasons why guns are not a 
danger to society.  Because the message was taken from a North American Internet website, 
spellings (e.g., “defense”) were changed to suit the New Zealand context (e.g., “defence”).  
Also, the particular words “felon” and “firearm” were changed to “criminal” and “gun” for 
the same purpose. 
 After participants read the pro-gun message, they were presented with the same six-
item scale as utilized in phase one.  Participants were asked to respond to these items four 
times by rating:  (a) their current agreement or disagreement with each statement (current self, 
α = .77), (b) how much they agreed or disagreed with each statement before reading the 
material (retrospective self, α = .78), (c) how much they think their classmates would 
currently agree or disagree with each statement (current other, α = .50), and (d) how much 
they think their classmates would have agreed or disagreed with each statement before 
reading the material (retrospective other, α = .70).  Again, participants were asked to respond 
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to each item on a seven-point scale from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 4 ‘neutral’ to 7 ‘strongly 
agree’.  Question order was randomised and the ordering of presentation of the attitude rating 
was blocked for ‘self’ and ‘other’ and then randomised across time (retrospective or current).  
Participants were then asked how much they thought the reading material would influence 
their own, their classmates’, and the general public’s attitudes towards gun control.  These 
items were measured on a seven-point scale from 1 ‘not at all’ to 4 ‘somewhat’ to 7 ‘very 
much’.  Question order was randomised.  Participants were then asked to indicate their code 
from phase one, were debriefed, and were thanked for their participation.   
Results and discussion 
Note that throughout the paper, we have used one-tailed tests where a-priori 
predictions have been made.  Results were entered into a 2 (person:  self/other) x 3 (time of 
attitude rating:  baseline/retrospective/current) repeated-measures ANOVA.  The ANOVA 
revealed a main effect for rated person, such that participants judged their classmates as more 
pro-gun (M = 3.66) than themselves overall (M = 2.94), F  (1,62) = 22.70 ,  p< .0001, η2 = 
.27.  This tendency was also significant for each time of attitude rating (all p-values<.01) and 
is consistent with a self-serving bias to perceive the self positively compared to others (e.g., 
Martijn, van der Pligt & Spears, 1996; Klein, 2001; Krueger & Dunning, 1999).  Results also 
revealed a main effect for time of attitude rating, such that mean pro-gun ratings increased 
with time from baseline (M = 3.18) to retrospective (M = 3.25) to current attitude (M = 3.46), 
F (2,62) = 4.79,  p < .01, η2 = .07.  Finally, there was an interaction between person 
(self/other) and time of attitude rating, F (2,62) = 7.48, p < .001, η2  = .11.   Table 1 shows the 
significant between-cell differences.  Note that not all comparisons in the table (also Tables 2 
and 3 for Studies 2 and 3) were theory-driven and that our discussions focus only on 
hypothesis-driven tests.  
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Perceived attitude change for self and others 
Examining the difference between current and retrospective attitudes provides an index of 
how much participants perceived their own, and others’ attitudes, to have changed.  These 
comparisons revealed, as hypothesised, that attitude change was perceived to occur for others 
but not for the self.  The difference scores between current and retrospective attitudes for self 
and others revealed that attitude change was also judged to be greater for others (M = 0.33) 
than the self (M = 0.07), t (64) = 1.88,  p< .03.   
Actual attitude change 
 Participants attitudes were more pro-gun in phase two than in phase one, indicating 
that they were influenced by the article.  However, participants’ perceptions of their own 
attitude change (current self - retrospective self, as above) were significantly lower than this 
actual net attitude change (self current – self-baseline, M = 0.45) so that paricipants 
underestimated the extent to which they were influenced, t (64) = 3.67, p < .005.   
Accuracy of attitude change perceptions 
 Further, participants’ actual attitude change was no different to the attitude change 
they attributed to their classmates (other current – other retrospective), t (64) = .61, ns.  As 
stated earlier, current-baseline attitudes for the self are the correct reference for evaluating the 
accuracy of current-retrospective scores for both self and others, because the best estimate of 
others’ scores are those of the self, since our sample and ‘others’ are one and the same.  
Because participants’ estimates of their own and others’ attitude change were no different, 
and yet participants significantly underestimated their own attitude change, this suggests that 
participants more closely predicted others’ attitude change than their own.     
 It is useful to consider how this inaccuracy about the self and accuracy about others 
may occur.  Participants retrospectively rated their earlier attitudes as more pro-gun than they 
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actually were at baseline, but no different to their current attitudes.  This suggests that 
participants did not realise that their attitudes had changed.  Perhaps they lack accurate recall 
of their original attitudes, and orient their recollections to match their current attitudes (cf. 
Bem & McConnell, 1970; Markus, 1986; Wixon & Laird, 1976).  For ratings of classmates’ 
attitudes, a different pattern emerged.  Participants retrospectively estimated their classmates’ 
attitudes to be marginally less pro-gun than they rated them at baseline, t (64) = 1.86 p < .08.  
Participants appear to have assimilated their retrospective self-ratings to be more like their 
current attitudes.  On the other hand, they appear to have contrasted estimates of others’ 
retrospective attitudes from estimates of their current attitudes.  This creates the illusion that 
others’ attitudes have changed, but not their own.  Overall, this pattern of results contrasts 
with the idea that people are accurate about their own degree of attitude change, and 
inaccurate about others’ (Gunther, 1991, 1995; Gunther & Thorson, 1992; McLeod et al., 
1997).  Here, participants more closely predicted others’ attitude change than their own.   
Single item measures 
Participants rated the influence of the message on their classmates to be greater (M = 
3.83) than on themselves (M = 2.77), t (64) = 6.31, p < .0001.  The perceived difference 
between the general public (M = 3.98) and the self was also significant, t (64) = 7.31, p < 
.0001, but the difference between the perceived effect on classmates and the general public 
was not significant, t (64) = 1.17, ns., which does not support the social distance hypothesis 
that third-person effects increase as the perceived other becomes more remote from the self 
(e.g., Duck et al., 1995; Duck et al., 1998; Gibbon & Durkin, 1995). However, it is possible 
that the perceived social distance between classmates and the general public was quite small 
due to the circumstances of this experiment.  The experiment was conducted at the beginning 
of semester when participants had not yet had a chance to develop a strong sense of group 
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identity.  Subsequently, they may not have perceived their classmates as very different from 
the broader general public.  
Finally, there was surprisingly no correlation between the ‘scale’ TPE (other estimated 
change – self estimated change) and the traditionally measured ‘classic’ TPE as measured by 
the items for both the participants’ classmates, r (81) = -.06, ns, and the general public, r (81) 
= -.008, ns.  We return to this issue in Study 2.   
Study 2 
 Having employed our new method of measuring the TPE, results of Study 1 indicate 
that people appear to underestimate the extent to which their own attitudes have changed.  We 
found no evidence to suggest that people overestimate the persuasibility of others.  We 
conducted a second study to clarify some methodological issues. In particular, when we asked 
participants to recall their prior attitudes, we asked them to recall what they thought ‘before 
reading the material’.  It is not clear that ‘before reading the material’ would be interpreted by 
participants to mean ‘the week before’, which was our original intention.  In reality therefore, 
the recalled attitude may have represented an already modified view based on participation in 
the first phase of the experiment.  Clearly we needed to rule out this potential problem and 
others associated with longitudinal designs.  We therefore conducted a second study utilising 
a cross-sectional design with a control group who did not read any message, and an 
experimental group who received a persuasive message.  In Study 2, we also tested the TPE in 
the realm of environmental issues, asking participants to rate their own and others’ attitudes 




                                                   Underestimating media influence on the self 15
Method 
Participants and design 
 A total of 87 male and female undergraduate psychology students at a New Zealand 
University participated in the experiment.  Participants’ median age was 28.1.  Each 
participant was rewarded with a small sweet for their participation.  The experiment consisted 
of a 2 (person:  self/other) x 2 (attitude rating:  retrospective/current) within-subjects design 
for the experimental condition.  Person and attitude rating were both manipulated within-
subjects.  We also included a control condition where person (self/other) was manipulated 
within-subjects.  Both control and experimental participants were taken from the same sample 
of undergraduate students and participants were randomly assigned to the control or 
experimental groups so that both groups did not differ in demographic characteristics.   
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants in the control group were informed that they were going to be asked some 
questions about the important issue of fossil fuel use and global warming.  The examples of 
fossil fuels given to participants were oil and gas.  Following this brief explanation of the 
task, participants were then presented with four statements about fossil fuel use.  These 
statements related to fossil fuel use harming the environment, governments restricting fossil 
fuel use, fossil fuel use and carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and the trade-off between 
economic growth and global warming.  The full set of items is presented in the Appendix.  
Note that two items were reverse-coded.  For each statement, participants were asked to rate 
either their own, or others’ disagreement on a seven-point scale from 1 ‘strongly agree’ to 4 
‘neutral’ to 7 ‘strongly agree’.  Those participants who rated their own attitudes first were 
asked to rate others’ attitudes second, and vice versa. 2  The reference ‘other’ was other 
students in the class, as in Study 1.  We acknowledged to our participants that they might find 
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this a difficult task, but nevertheless asked them for their ‘best guess’ as to what these others’ 
attitudes might be.  
 Participants in the experimental condition were informed that they would be asked to 
read some material about the important issue of fossil fuel use and global warming, and to 
answer some questions.  At this point, participants were given a pro-fossil fuel use message 
entitled “The myth of fossil fuel use and global warming”.  The message was adapted for our 
purposes from a PDF document appearing on an Internet website called “Fossilfuels.org” 
(http://www.fossilfuels.org/pdf/FDPart01.pdf).  The message argued on the basis of scientific 
evidence that fossil fuel use does not harm the environment.  It argued that carbon dioxide 
(CO2) is the basis of all life, and is not a pollutant.  It also argued that any climate change 
resulting from increased CO2 in the atmosphere was benign.  After participants read the pro-
fossil fuel use message, they were presented with the same four-item scale as for the control 
participants.  Participants were asked to respond to these items four times by rating:  (a) their 
current agreement or disagreement with each statement (current self), (b) how much they 
agreed or disagreed with each statement before reading the material (retrospective self), (c) 
how much they think their classmates would currently agree or disagree with each statement 
(current other), and (d) how much they think their classmates would have agreed or disagreed 
with each statement before reading the material (retrospective other).  Again, participants 
were asked to respond to each item on a seven-point scale from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 4 
‘neutral’ to 7 ‘strongly agree’.  Question order was blocked for ‘self’ and ‘other’ and then 
alternated across time (retrospective or current), such that there were four different versions of 
the questionnaire.  Across the control and experimental groups, reliabilities for the fossil fuel 
scale were acceptable (self current α = .63, other current α = .70, self retrospective α = .83, 
other retrospective α = .57).  However, omitting the item concerning economic growth and 
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global warming considerably increased the reliability of the scale (αs of .69, .71, .93 and .66 
retrospectively).  So, all analyses were conducted on the three-item scale, with the economic 
growth item removed.  3 
 Participants were also asked how much they thought the message would influence 
their own, and their classmates’ opinions concerning fossil fuel use to provide traditional TPE 
measures.  Participants were asked to respond on a seven-point scale from 1 ‘the message 
would influence opinions to become more in favour of fossil fuel use’ to 4 ‘the message 
would not influence opinions, to 7 ‘the message would influence opinions to become more 
against fossil fuel use.  As readers will recall, the correlations between the TPE items and 
attitude change measures in Study 1 were not significant.  These correlations took on the one 
hand the TPE item score and on the other, the degree to which each person mis-estimated 
their own attitude change (other estimated change – self estimated change).  A possible reason 
why these correlations were non significant could be because in Study 1, we did not specify 
the direction of the influence.  In Study 2, we questioned participants whether they thought 
the message would influence their attitudes to become more pro-fossil fuel use, neutral, or 
more anti-fossil fuel use, making the measure more compatible with, and therefore more 
directly comparable to, the TPE scale measurements.  Question order was randomised.  
Participants were then debriefed, and were thanked for their participation.   
Results and discussion 
 Results for the experimental group were entered into a 2 (person:  self/other) x 2 
(attitude rating:  retrospective/current) repeated measures ANOVA.  The analysis revealed 
that participants rated their classmates as more pro-fossil fuel use (M = 2.68) than themselves 
overall (M = 2.33), F (1,41) = 8.51, p < .01, η2 = .17, as in Study 1.  Results also revealed a 
main effect for attitude rating, such that mean pro-fossil fuel ratings increased from 
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retrospective (M = 2.33) to current (M = 2.69), F (1,41) = 5.76, p < .05, η2 = .12, as in Study 
1.  Finally, the interaction between person (self/other) and attitude rating, was marginally 
significant, F (1,41) = 3.11, p = .085, η2 = .07.  Significant between-cell differences are 
displayed in Table 2.   
Perceived attitude change for self and others 
We examined the difference between current and retrospective attitudes, and as in 
Study 1, results revealed that attitude change was perceived to occur for others, but not for the 
self.  The difference scores between current and retrospective attitudes for self and others 
revealed that attitude change was also judged to be greater for others than the self,  (Ms = 0.54 
and 0.18), t (41) = 1.77, p < .05, as in Study 1.   
Actual attitude change 
Participants were more pro-fossil fuel use in the experimental group than in the control 
group, indicating, as in Study 1, that attitude change would have occurred.  However, 
participants’ perceptions of their own attitude change (M = 0.18) were significantly lower 
than actual attitude change that would have occurred (M = 0.51), so that participants 
underestimated the extent to which they would have been influenced, t (41) = 2.75, p < .005, 
as they did in Study 1.   
Accuracy of attitude change perceptions 
Further, participants’ actual attitude change was no different to the attitude change 
they attributed to their classmates, t (41) = .17, ns.  Therefore, as in Study 1, participants’ 
estimates of their own and others’ attitude change were no different, and yet participants 
significantly underestimated the attitude change that would have occurred for themselves.  
Therefore, participants again more closely predicted others’ attitude change than what their 
own would have been.   
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 Experimental group participants’ retrospective ratings of their attitudes were 
marginally more pro-fossil fuel use than the attitudes of the control group, t (87) = 1.5,  p= 
.07, but no different to current attitudes.  This suggests, although less conclusively than in 
Study 1, that participants mis-estimated what their original attitudes would have been (cf. 
Bem & McConnell, 1970; Wixon & Laird, 1976).  Participants did not rate others’ 
retrospective attitudes to be lower than the control (no message) group.  As in Study 1, these 
results suggest that participants possibly assimilated their retrospective self-ratings to be more 
like their current attitudes.  However, they did not do this in their judgements of others, so 
attitude change appears apparent for others but not for the self.   
Single item measures 
 Participants rated that the message would influence their classmates’ attitudes to 
become more pro-fossil fuel use (M = 3.33) but that their own attitudes would remain neutral 
(M = 4.02).  This difference in perceived influence was significant, t (42) = 4.01, p < .001.  In 
Study 2, we have no univariate score indicating how much each person was inaccurate about 
their own prior attitudes, so we cannot assess the correlation between the TPE and attitude 
change.  The correlation between the TPE on the scale (other estimated change – self 
estimated change) and the ‘classic’ TPE on the item (for classmates) was, however 
significant, r (42) = .40, p < .01. 
Study 3 
 Results of Study 2 largely support those of Study 1, suggesting that people 
underestimate the extent to which their attitudes would have changed as a result of a 
persuasive message.  Again, we found no evidence that people overestimated the extent to 
which others’ attitudes would have changed.  There was also a significant correlation between 
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the TPE as measured by traditional items, and as measured by attitude change scales, in 
contrast to Study 1.  
 In Study 3, we aimed to investigate the overestimation/underestimation issue further, 
using a different message type.  Rather than presenting participants with a ‘negative’ 
persuasive message as is traditionally used in studies of third-person perceptions, we 
presented participants with a positive or socially desirable message.  This took the form of 
material arguing against fossil fuel use for envirnomental reasons.  Research to date suggests 
that under such conditions, the third-person effect is often reversed so that people perceive 
themselves as more likely to be influenced than others (e.g., Duck et al., 1995; Hoorens & 
Ruiter, 1996; Innes & Zeitz, 1988).  The overestimation/underestimation issue remains to be 
tested for positive messages.    
Indeed, if the inaccuracy always lies within the self, then we might expect people to 
overestimate the extent to which they are influence by positive media content, and again to be 
accurate about the effect the message has on others.  This would make intuitive sense, as 
people may feel that positive attitude change is acceptable, yet may not like to admit that their 
attitudes have changed towards a socially undesirable opinion.  Recent research investigating 
people’s perceptions of self/other differences in pro-social behaviour may shed some light on 
the ‘reversed’ TPE.  Epley and Dunning (2000) examined peope’s perceptions of their own 
and others’ charitable behaviours and their results revealed that people overestimate the extent 
to which they will engage in selfless and generous behaviours, but are accurate about the 
frequency of such behaviours performed by peers.  Perhaps therefore, people will also 
overestimate the extent to which they are influenced by positive media.   
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Method 
Participants and design 
 A total of 92 males and females participated in the experiment, with a median age of 
33.72, which is comparable in age to our sample from Study 2.  Participants in this study were 
a sample of friends and family of undergraduate social psychology students at a New Zealand 
University.  The experiment consisted of a 2 (person:  self/other) x 2 (attitude rating:  
retrospective/current) within-subjects design for the experimental group.  Person and attitude 
rating were both manipulated within-subjects.  We also included a control condition where 
person was manipulated within-subjects.  Both control and experimental participants were 
taken from the same sample of friends and family and participants were randomly assigned to 
the control or experimental group so that both groups did not differ in demographic 
characteristics.   
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants in the control group followed the same procedure as the control group 
participants in Study 2.  However, in place of asking participants to rate the attitudes of others 
in their class, they were asked to rate the attitudes of friends and family of social psychology 
students at the university where the investigation was undertaken.  We acknowledged to our 
participants that they might find this a difficult task, but nevertheless asked them for their 
‘best guess’ as to what their attitudes might be.  We made this change to previous studies 
mainly for ease of data collection.  However, we also anticipated the possibility of ceiling 
effects amongst a sample of (possibly quite liberal) undergraduate students, that could 
potentially be avoided by sampling the general population.   
 Participants in the experimental condition were informed that they would be asked to 
read some material about the important issue of fossil fuel use and global warming, and to 
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answer some questions.  At this point, participants were given an anti-fossil fuel use message 
entitled “The truth about fossil fuel use and global warming”.  The message was adapted from 
the message utilised in Study 2, so that the message argued against fossil fuel use rather in 
favour.  The message argued on the basis of scientific evidence that fossil fuel use harms the 
environment.  It argued that increased levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) brought about by use of 
fossil fuels causes damaging climate change.   
After participants read the pro-fossil fuel use message, they were presented with the 
same four-item scale as for the control participants.  Participants were asked to respond to 
these items four times by rating:  (a) their current agreement or disagreement with each 
statement (current self), (b) how much they agreed or disagreed with each statement before 
reading the material (retrospective self), (c) how much they think friends and family of social 
psychology students at the university would currently agree or disagree with each statement 
(current other), and (d) how much they think friends and family of social psychology students 
at the university would have agreed or disagreed with each statement before reading the 
material (retrospective other).  Again, participants were asked to respond to each item on a 
seven-point scale from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 4 ‘neutral’ to 7 ‘strongly agree’.  Question 
order was blocked for ‘self’ and ‘other’ and then alternated across time (retrospective or 
current), such that there were four different versions of the questionnaire.   
Across the control and experimental groups, reliabilities for the fossil fuel scale were 
acceptable (self current α = .74, other current α = .75, self retrospective α = .73, other 
retrospective α = .74).  However as in Study 2, omitting the item concerning economic 
growth and global warming increased the reliability of the scale (αs of .74, .79, .77 and .76 
retrospectively).  So, all analyses were conducted on the three-item scale, with the economic 
growth item removed.  
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 Participants were also asked how much they thought the message would influence 
their own, and their comparison others’ opinions concerning fossil fuel use.  Participants were 
asked to respond on a seven-point scale from 1 ‘the message would influence opinions to 
become more in favour of fossil fuel use’ to 4 ‘the message would not influence opinions, to 7 
‘the message would influence opinions to become more against fossil fuel use’.  Question 
order was randomised.  Participants were then debriefed, and were thanked for their 
participation.   
Results and discussion 
 Results for the experimental group were entered into a 2 (person:  self/other) x 2 
(attitude rating:  retrospective/current) repeated measures ANOVA.  The analysis revealed 
that participants rated others as less against fossil fuel use (M = 5.58) than themselves overall 
(M = 6.03),  F (1,42) = 15.61, p < .001, η2 = .27 which is in line with Studies 1 and 2 where 
participants attributed more socially desirable attitudes to the self than others.  Results also 
revealed a main effect for attitude rating, such that mean anti-fossil fuel ratings increased 
from retrospective (M = 5.54) to current (M = 6.06), F (1,42) = 46.63, p < .001, η2 = .53.  
Finally, the interaction between person (self/other) and attitude rating was significant, F 
(1,42) = 10.20,  p < .01, η2 = .20.  Significant between-cell differences are shown in Table 3.   
Attitude change perceptions for self and others 
 As in Studies 1 and 2, perceived attitude change for both self and others were 
calculated by comparing current attitudes with retrospective attitudes.  Participants attributed 
attitude change to others as in Studies 1 and 2, but also to themselves in contrast to previous 
studies.  However, as in Studies 1 and 2, participants perceived others to be more persuaded 
than themselves, (Ms = 0.70 and 0.35), t (42) = 3.20, p < .01.  Even in the case of a socially 
                                                   Underestimating media influence on the self 24
desirable message where participants did admit to being persuaded themselves (unlike Studies 
1 and 2), participants still perceived others to be more influenced than themselves.   
Actual attitude change 
As predicted, participants’ current attitudes were more anti-fossil fuel use in the 
experimental group than in the control group.  This suggests that people in the experimental 
group were caused by the message to become more against fossil-fuel use than they would 
have been given no message.   
Accuracy of attitude change perceptions 
The difference between the control and experimental groups (M = 0.57) was no 
different to the attitude change participants attributed to others (M = 0.70), t (42) = 1.21, ns.  
That is, participants accurately estimated the attitude change that would have occurred for 
others, as expected, and this finding is consistent with Studies 1 and 2.  However, 
participants’ estimates of their own attitude change (M = 0.35) were significantly lower than 
what their actual attitude change would have been, t (42) = 2.99, p < .01.  Therefore, people 
did not overestimate the extent to which their attitudes would have changed in the direction of 
positive influence as we may have expected.  In line with Studies 1 and 2, participants again 
significantly underestimated the extent to which their attitudes would have changed. 
Single-item measures 
 Participants rated that the message would influence others’ attitudes to become more 
against fossil fuel use (M = 5.80) more than their own (M = 5.48).  This difference in 
perceived influence was significant, t (42) = 2.55, p < .01 and further supports the typical 
rather than the ‘reversed’ TPE.  However, the correlation between the TPE on the scale (other 
estimated change – self estimated change) and the ‘classic’ TPE on the items (for others) was 
not significant, r (43) = .05, ns, in contrast to Study 2.  
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General Discussion   
In summary, the methodology we employed in Study 1 disentangled the components 
of attitude change judgements implicated in third-person perceptions: first-person and third-
person judgements, and retrospective and current judgements.  Results of Study 1 showed, 
contrary to previous research (Gunther, 1991, Gunther & Thorson, 1992, but see Cohen et al., 
1988), that people appeared to underestimate the extent of their own persuasibility, rather than 
overestimating the extent of others’ persuasibility.  Results of Studies 2 and 3, utilising cross-
sectional experimental designs, lend support to this analysis.  Therefore, returning to issue of 
censorship endorsement, it would appear that people’s desire to censor material is not related 
to overly pessimistic views about the extent to which others are influenced.  Because our 
participants accurately estimated others’ attitude change, our results suggest that endorsing 
censorship may be based on a realistic assessment of the degree to which others are 
influenced, but perhaps also an overly optimistic view of their own persuasibility.   
In regard to the more general issue of whether self-other biases arise from errors in 
perception of the self or others, our results show that whereas people are accurate about 
others’ attitude change, they are wrong about others’ current attitudes.  In our studies, 
participants consistently displayed undue negativity about others’ attitudes, perceiving them 
to be less desirable than they actually were.  Overall, this pattern of results suggests that there 
is perhaps no invariant locus of error in self-other biases.  Sometimes these biases are likely to 
emerge from errors about the self (cf., Epley & Dunning, 1999; Klar & Giladi, 1999), and 
sometimes from errors about others (cf., Klein & Weinstein, 1997).  In our view, because the 
locus of error in self-other bias appears to be contingent rather than invariant, researchers 
ought to examine the theoretical and empirical grounds for predicting that the perception of 
(a) the self and (b) of others is accurate in particular domains. For example, the present 
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research was informed by earlier findings that people have little access to changes in their 
own attitudes (Bem & McConnell, 1970; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  In other domains, 
individuals may be rather accurate about themselves (Ericsson & Simon, 1993).     
An important methodological issue requires some discussion here.  In Study 2, the 
difference between perceived self and others’ attitude change as measured by the scales, was 
significantly correlated with the traditionally measured TPE, as we expected.  We argue that 
the ‘scale’ and ‘classic’ TPEs should be correlated because they are measuring the same 
construct - the difference in perceived attitude change between self and others.  However, in 
Studies 1 and 3, this correlation was not significant.  Methodological differences between our 
studies may be responsible for this inconsistency.  As we mentioned earlier, the results of 
Study 1 are less reliable than Study 2 because the measure of the ‘scale’ TPE was flawed.  By 
asking for participants attitudes ‘before reading the material’, we cannot be sure that their 
reported attitudes were those they held at the beginning of the experiment, before 
participating in the first phase and engaging in thought about the issue of gun control.  Our 
original intention could have been better achieved by asking participants to simply recall their 
opinions ‘from the week before’.  As such, the lack of correlation between the ‘attitude scale’ 
and ‘classic’ TPE is perhaps not surprising.  Also, Study 3 employed a group of others that 
was not particularly well-defined (i.e., friends and family of students at the university).  It is 
unlikely that participants will have well-formed opinions about such a heterogeneous group.  
Nor would they naturally compare their own opinions with the opinions of this group.  We 
may therefore be able to place more confidence in the results of Study 2 than Studies 1 and 3, 
and the stronger correlation between the ‘attitude scale’ and ‘classic’ TPE obtained in this 
study.  
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Further research is required to clarify other questions relating to the TPE.  Our results 
have interesting implications for studies of positive message influence, as examined in Study 
3.  We originally proposed that inaccuracy about the self in this case may mean that people 
self-servingly overestimate the extent to which their attitudes have changed as a result of a 
positive message.  However, participants actually underestimated the extent to which their 
attitudes would have changed, just as they did in the case of negative messages in Studies 1 
and 2.  So we did not replicate the reversed TPE as obtained in other research (e.g., Duck et 
al., 1995; Hoorens & Ruiter, 1996; Innes & Zeitz, 1988).  It is also interesting to note that we 
did not replicate the reversed TPE as measured by traditional items.  Participants reported that 
the message would influence others to become more against fossil fuel use than themselves.   
It may be the case that people perceive that they themselves already hold the socially 
desirable view advocated by the message whilst others may not.  If this is the case, then it 
would be perfectly reasonable to expect people to perceive others as more influenced than 
themselves.  It is also important to note that not all studies investigating the impact of positive 
messages have shown greater perceived influence on the self over others.  Duck and 
colleagues (1995) only observed a reversed TPE when positive messages (in this case, AIDS 
advertisements) were perceived to be ‘high quality’.  No reversal occurred for messages seen 
as ‘low quality’.  Further, the TPE was reversed for participants who believed strongly that it 
was good to be influenced by AIDS campaigns but other participants did not distinguish 
between the level of impact on self and others.  Also, Duck and colleagues (1999) found that 
high identifiers (in this case, with a student ingroup) perceived AIDS advertisements to have 
more influence on themselves than others, but low identifiers displayed the typical TPE.  This 
research suggests that the TPE is not always reversed for positive messages. It is not the 
desirability of the message per se, but when influence is “normatively acceptable” (p. 1879), 
                                                   Underestimating media influence on the self 28
that determines the direction of the TPE.  Other factors such as social identity also moderate 
the reversal of the TPE. 
It is important, however to acknowledge the limitations of Study 3.  First, the inclusion 
of a condition where participants read an undesirable message would have allowed us to make 
a direct comparison between the effects of desirable and undesirable messages on perceived 
and actual influence.   Further, the sample and target group could have been more consistent 
with Studies 1 and 2, as mentioned before.  It is also likely that results suffered from near 
ceiling effects as participants ratings of current attitudes approached the upper end of the 
scale.  Finally, a manipulation check assessing message desirability (also an issue for Study 2) 
could have been included to assure that participants did indeed perceive the message to be 
positive and/or socially desirable.  However, despite these issues, Study 3 provides a 
promising glance into the effects of desirable messages on perceived and actual attitude 
change, and suggests that further research should perhaps pay closer attention to the validity 
of the ‘reversed TPE’.       
These results also have interesting implications for the use of retrospective pre-testing 
in assessing change (cf. Rippey, Geller & King, 1978; Sprangers & Hoogstraten, 1989).  This 
technique, typically used in evaluating learning programmes, measures change by comparing 
retrospective pre-test ratings with post-test ratings.  The difference between the two indicates 
how much learning has occurred.  Our results, however, imply that people may not be able to 
accurately report their previous attitudes.  Therefore, it may perhaps also be the case that self-
reports of abilities and knowledge are not completely reliable, questioning the utility of 
retrospective pre-testing as a tool for assessing change.    
Research on attitude change and third-person perceptions lie at the intersection 
between two academic disciplines, namely communication and social psychology.  This 
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research also lies at the intersection between different areas of social psychological inquiry, 
such as self-perception, self-serving biases, and intergroup processes.  This paper makes 
substantial progress in mapping out this intersection.  It provides a novel approach to the 
study of the TPE and its results provide new answers to some outstanding questions.  
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Footnotes 
1 In Study 1, we consistently measured ‘self’ attitudes prior to ‘other’ attitudes in the 
initial phase, and did not vary the ordering of the questions; previous research suggests 
that question order in TPE studies does not influence responses (see Gunther, 1995; 
Price & Tewksbury, 1996; Tiedge, Silverblatt, Havice & Rosenfeld, 1991, but see 
Dupagne et al., 1999).  Also, see footnote 2.   
2 In Study 2 we counterbalanced the ordering of questionning (self/other) and found no 
differences.   
3 The removal of the economic item did not influence the outcome of any of the 
hypotheses in either Studies 2 or 3.   
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Appendix 
Gun control attitudes scale (Study 1) 
It is not people’s right to own guns. 
Taking guns away is taking away people’s right to protect themselves. 
People over-inflate the danger of guns to society. 
The government should restrict gun ownership. 
Guns are too dangerous to be freely available to the public. 
Restricting gun laws is unfair on people who use guns for sport and recreation. 
 
Fossil fuel use attitude scale (Studies 2 and 3) 
Current use of fossil fuels is harming the environment. 
International governments should attempt to decrease the use of fossil fuels. 
Increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is a good thing for the environment.    
International governments should seek to maximise economic growth, even if this results in 
global warming.     
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Table 1.  Results of Study 1.  Mean (and standard deviation) baseline, retrospective and 
current attitudes towards gun control for self and other.  Higher values indicate more ‘pro-
gun’ attitudes.  
                          Attitude rating 
               Baseline          Retrospective            Current 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Self  2.67 (1.20)aa  3.04 (1.20)bb         3.11 (1.14)bb 
Person                                       _____________________________________________ 
    
Other  3.75 (0.94)de  3.46 (0.92)ef         3.79 (0.96)dg 
  _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Means that share a subscript are not significantly different at p < .05. 
 
 
Table 2.  Results of Study 2.  Mean (and standard deviation) control, retrospective and 
current attitudes towards fossil fuel use for self and other.  Higher values indicate more ‘pro-
fossil fuel use’ attitudes.  
                       Attitude rating 
               Control        Retrospective            Current 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Self  1.91 (0.85)aa        2.24 (1.18)ab      2.42 (1.11)bb 
Person                                      _____________________________________________ 
    
Other  2.41 (0.74)bb        2.41 (0.89)bb       2.95 (1.13)cc 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Means that share a subscript are not significantly different at p < .05.  
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Table 3.  Results of Study 3.  Mean (and standard deviation) control, retrospective and 
current attitudes against fossil fuel use for self and other.  Higher values indicate more ‘anti-
fossil fuel use’ attitudes.  
                       Attitude rating 
               Control        Retrospective            Current 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Self  5.63 (1.15)a         5.85 (1.03)a           6.20 (0.83)b 
Person                       _____________________________________________________ 
    
Other  5.28 (1.03)c         5.23 (1.14)c           5.93 (0.96)a 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Means that share a subscript are not significantly different at p < .05.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
